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BOOK REVIEWS
COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS. By Walter F.
Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett, Editors. New York:
Random House, 1961. Pp. XVIII, 707. $4.95.
Until very recent years, almost any political scientist writing or teaching in the area of public law could be expected to
approach his subject in much the same way as his law school
colleague. The casebook would form the basis for classroom
work while the goal of both teaching and research was the
illumination of some particular facet of substantive (usually
constitutional or administrative) law. Most courses, indeed,
are still organized in this way; there has been underway for
some time, however, a shift in the direction of lessened attention to questions of legal substance and of increased concern with the role and function of courts within the political
context of which they are inescapably a part. Such an approach suggests that instruction and research in legal materials are somehow incomplete unless they take notice of the
complex o finstitutional, situational or psychological variables
within which judicial activity takes place, with which it may
interact and upon which it may have significant impact.
It is just such an orientation that Professors Murphy (Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University) and
Pritchett (Professor and Chairman of the Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago) follow in this work.
Dating in its earliest stages at least from the 1937 "switch
in time that saved nine," receiving considerable impetus from
Professor Pritchett's bloc analyses of the Roosevelt and Vinson courts, and continuing to mature perhaps most prominently in the works of Glendon A. Schubert, this orientation
has produced a considerable body of meaningful research. It
is this volume of material-or at least a careful sampling of
it-that the editors now make available in readily accessible
form to the student of judicial institutions.
There is here, for example, an instance of Vose's studies
of the relationship of pressure groups and courts, an illustration of the applicability of mathematical research techniques from the works of Pritchett, Schubert and S. Sidney
Ulmer, as well as Gordon Patric's examination of the social
and political impact of McCollum v. Board of Education!' Ci1.

333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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tation of these materials, however, should not be taken to
mean that the editors have in any sense neglected the more
traditional observations, descriptions and evaluations of the
judicial process. Holmes' "Path of the Law" is reproduced
as are carefully chosen selections of Cardozo's lectures in the
nature of the judicial process; indeed, virtually every major
contemporary or near-contemporary legal light is represented
here by one or more works.
Cases selected are employed for the most part as illustrations of judicial or judicially-related behavior and only seldom
for the presentation of one segment or another of a jurisprudential argument or for whatever light they may shed on
substantive areas of the law. Caminetti v. United States2 and
United States v. . Harriss,3 for example, are placed in close
juxtaposition-not for their relevance, respectively, to the
Mann Act or the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, but as
illustrations of the process of statutory interpretation. Relevant cases have also been selected to depict the ways in which
the operation of judicial bureaucracy may inhibit the powers
of certain of its components; in a section titled "Virgil Hawkins Goes to Law" the editors have reproduced the opinions
delivered by the Florida Supreme Court and by each level of
the federal court system in the attempts by one Virgil Hawkins, a Negro, supported eventually by the United States
Supreme Court, to lower the racist barriers of Hawkins' enrollment in the University of Florida Law School.
To provide a general setting for such materials, the editors
have organized their work in terms of eight separate points
of focus; the judicial role and its organization, judicial selection and the bar, the sources and instruments of judicial
power, avenues of access to the courts and to whom they are
open, judicial reasoning, the decisional process, limits of
judicial decision-making, and the role of the judiciary in a
democratic social order. Each of these topics is dealt with in
a separate major division, subdivided, in turn, into relevanf
chapters.
It is, of course, of considerable value not to say convenience
to have collected in one place the materials contained here. It
2.
3.

242 U.S. 470 (1917).
347 U.S. 612 (1954).
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could well be that without more the editors' contribution
would have been sufficient. But there is more-and therein
lies what this reviewer feels is the major value of this work.
Most editors of collections of readings provide something in
the way of transitional materials before or at least at regular
intervals among their selections. Professors Murphy and
Pritchett have gone beyond what is too often only a cursory
level of explanation or comment and have written detailed,
often searching essays to introduce each of the seventeen
chapters. One suspects that with a minimum of editing, these
essays could well stand by themselves as contributions to the
literature. The editors have supplemented each of these introductions, moreover, with well chosen bibliographies and,
where necessary, with explanatory comments in preface of
individual selections.
One could quarrel with particulars in this work (e.g., the
lack of specific reference of some of the selections to the introductory discussions, what this reviewer felt to be a too
heavy reliance on the writings of Justice Frankfurter, and
the like), but little would be gained. Viewed as a whole, weighed in terms of its largest implications, this book, though designed for use in university courses in public law, is deserving
of a wide readership. It will serve well any who seek a reasoned understanding of our judicial system.
JAMES HERNDON*

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW. By Dwight G. McCarty.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960.
Pp. XII, 463. $10.00
The paper cover of McCarty's book proclaims it as "a new
legal psychological approach to understanding human behavior." Certainly few lawyers or psychologists can afford to
ignore such a promise. The remainder of the dust jacket "Reveals what REALLY makes clients, witnesses, the judge
and jury-even opposing attorneys-tick. Tells WHY they
react as they do, and HOW you can win them over-or beat
them-in every day legal encounters as well as the most complicated aspects of a trial." - tends to raise a good deal of skep*

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Dakota.
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ticism before opening the covers of this rather large book.
If five years of graduate education and nine years of professional experience have done nothing else for this reviewer,
they have made him increasingly wary of quick and easy formulas for understanding what REALLY makes people tick.
However, publishers are in the business to sell books and dust
jacket statements are generally designed to attract attention
and do not necessarily represent the point of view of the
author. With this thought the next step was to read the author's preface. This certainly served to allay many apprehensions since the author identified himself "As an attorney long
in active practice . . ." and went on to describe some of the
areas to be covered; for example the ". . . McNaughten right
and wrong rule in criminal responsibility, with the new impact
of the Durham case, together with the legal implications of
the psychiatric examination of prisoners."
The first six chapters, are designed to give the reader a
brief overview of the basic concepts in psychology, treating
such topics as heredity and environment, motives, habits, etc.
The author quotes from a wide variety of very excellent and
standard works in the field of Psychology and presents a
rather comprehensive survey of these concepts. At this point
your reviewer began to suffer some rather serious reservations about his commitment to the editors of the Law Review.
Obviously the book was written for lawyers and one very
pertinent question concerned the level of knowledge of psychology possessed by the average practicing attorney. To this
the reviewer must confess absolute ignorance; thus the evaluation which follows is based on two suppositions: (1) that
the author who is a practicing attorney has a reasonably good
idea concerning his potential readers and (2) that the author
has hit his mark in his estimate concerning the amount of
knowledge of psychology possessed by his readers.
With the above ideas in mind, the first six chapters can be
summarized very briefly. While most of the material is not
factually incorrect,1 so many new concepts (presumably) are
presented with a minimum of explanation that some question
is raised as to how much can be learned from this broad scale,
superficial approach.
The middle section of this book deals with general applica-

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

tion of principles to areas of interest to the attorney. Here
again superficiality and oversimplification seem to be the keynote. Much of this will undoubtedly lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the ideas that were presented. In the
chapter on "Psychiatric Examination of Prisoners," the author
seems to take the extreme position that criminal behavior
and psychotic behavior is due to defects in the "lower" part
of the brain. The general approach in this chapter and the
next chapter on "Disordered Personalities" has a very heavy
organic and genetic orientation which certainly cannot be
supported by the information currently available.
The last portion deals with the "Client, the Judge, the Jury,
and Strategy in the Lawsuit." Most of the discussions centered
on rather obvious common sense observations and this reviewer found little that preceptive individuals have'not utilized for years.
A topic such as "Psychology and the Law" is one in which
all lawyers should have some interest and knowledge. It is
this reviewer's opinion that McCarty does not come close to
meeting the requirements he sets forth in his preface. The book
is more like a large collection of different ideas, few developed
adequately and most -superficial or oversimplified to the point
of becoming trite.
RALPH H. KOLSTOE*
1. One rather glaring exception occurs on page 50. In discussing I.Q.
tests the author states: "In the test 100 to 120 is considered normal." Most
so called I.Q. tests are constructed so that the average score will be 100,
thus any "normal" range will extend as far below 100 as above. Depending
on statistical characteristics, the "normal" range of scores will vary
somewhat from test to test however 90-110 would be a more accurate
description of a general range of "normal."
* Associate Professor of Psychology, University of North Dakota.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY. By Louis R. Frumer and Melvin
I. Friedman. New York: Matthew Bender and Co., Inc., 1960.
Two Volumes: $45.00.
Since my review of Volume I of this work Volume II has
been released.'
This volume begins with allergies and the peculiar susceptibility of the individual to a product. After discussing the medi1.

Volume I reviewed in 37 N.D.L. Rev. 136 (1961).
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cal aspects of allergic reactions there is a list of points a
plaintiff should try to show in a case involving allergy or irritation -allegedly caused by some commercial product. The first
of these is that not only the plaintiff but others were similarly
affected. This very simply points out what I would consider
the central problem of an allergy or irritation resulting from
the use of a product - that is the problem of the plaintiff's
sensitivity to this type of product. As the authors point out,
allergy liability is quite different from MacPherson's measurable world of defective wheels and contaminated preparations.
Assume that the product is properly prepared before it is sold
to the plaintiff. Yet there may be many persons whose system
would react to this product. Without having knowledge of the
susceptibility of some persons to a product there would appear
to be no duty on the part of the manufacturer to warn prospective users. The question then becomes whether defendant
sufficiently tested the product before releasing it on the
market.
The proof of peculiar sensitivity of a plaintiff or a selective group of persons will not be sufficient if the courts hold
that a warranty extends only in favor of "normal" persons
and allergic persons are not considered normal. The majority
of cases, according to the authors, hold or recognize that if a
product can be used by 'a "nomal" person without injury,
there is no breach of an implied warranty of fitness or
merchantability.
Inflammable substances particularly as applied to clothing
are also discussed in this volume. It is pointed out that inflammable substance cases contain a large number of the duty to
warn cases. Even before MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 2
liability was imposed for failure to warn of inflammable substances as an exception to the privity requirement. Since then
liability has been sustained against both manufacturers and
retailers where the injury resulted from a forseeable use of
the product - as clothing made of a dangerously inflammable
fabric - both on a negligence and warranty theory.
Pleading and practice as well as discovery and demonstrative evidence as applied to products liability cases are
thoroughly discussed. None of this material can be said to
2.

217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916).
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contain anything new, but will serve as a useful check list
in preparing an action.
A chapter is devoted to drugs and druggists. Of course, in
the case of a druggist who in filling a prescription substitutes,
or mixes the wrong dosage there is a fairly clear case of liability on the theory that the duty of care is commensurate
with the superior knowledge of the druggists. However, in
the sale of a patent or proprietory medicine the druggist as a
general rule is not liable for negligence but may be liable on
a warranty theory just as the seller of any other article.
The second half of Volume II contains an index of cases by
product. This is an extremely effective short cut method of
research which I have already used several times.
Products Liability appears to be extremely well researched
and complete. The material is presented in an extremely
usable manner and will be beneficial to the practitioner.
WILLIAM F.

HODNY*

* Member of firm of Gallagher & Hodny, Mandan, North Dakota, Member of Morton County Bar and State Bar Association of North Dakota.

